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WEST VIRGINIA
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Volume 57 March, 1955 Number I
COVENANTS IN LEASES IN WEST VIRGINIA
LONDo H. BRowN*
The subject of covenants in leases has been dealt with by the
courts and legal writers time and time again until it would seem
that there can be very little said on the subject which has not
already been said before and perhaps said many times.
However, the subject has not been before the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia many times and, when it has been
before that court, no detailed consideration has been given it in
most instances. General statements have been made, and general
rules have been laid down, often without a reason for the statement
or rule and sometimes with reasons not entirely supported by
adequate authority. Some statutes on the subject have been sum-
marily mentioned by the court, and others have yet to be mentioned
and construed.
The purpose of this paper is to consider covenants in general
and covenants in leases which run with the land in particular.
After a fairly general discussion of these two phases of the subject,
an attempt will be made to analyze and discuss various West
Virginia decisions and statutes having to do with covenants in
leases which run with the land in the light of the common law
and the law in other jurisdictions.
It is hoped that in treating the subject in this manner this
paper will be of some benefit to the court and to lawyers in their
future consideration of this interesting, if confusing, subject.
Covenants in General
The word "covenant" is derived from the Latin words "con-
venire", meaning to come together, and "conventio", meaning a
coming together.1
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I 1 Bouvmes LAw DicTIONARY 715 (8th ed. 1914).
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A covenant may be defined as an agreement between two or
more persons to do or permit the doing of a particular act,2 or a
promise or stipulation that certain facts are true;" but these defini-
tions unduly limit the meaning of a word which has a very broad
meaning and leave the impression that it is only used in an
affirmative sense. Since there are also negative covenants, it is
perhaps better to say that it is an agreement between two or more
persons whereby one of the persons promises the performance or
nonperformance of certain acts, or that a given state of things does
or shall, or does not or shall not, exist.4
As to the characteristics of covenants, they are generally sub-
ject to the same rules as other contracts in regard to the qualifica-
tions of parties, the assent required and the purpose for which the
contract is made.
A covenant is an agreement of the covenantor only,5 and no
particular words are necessary to create a covenant., Any words
importing an agreement may be a covenant,7 the precise form of
the covenant is of no consequence if the intention is reasonably
dear, and the obvious purpose should not be defeated by a technical
construction of the language used.8 But there must be some agree-
ment or promise to do or not to do a certain thing, or that a
given state of facts does or shall, or does not or shall not, exist,
before a provision in an instrument will be found to be a covenant,
and a court will not torture a representation and the like into a
covenant.9
2 Israelsky v. Levine, 124 Misc. 827, 209 N.Y. Supp. 577 (1925).
2 Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 64 A.2d 44 (1949).
4 Olcott v. Southworth, 115 Vt. 421, 63 A.2d 189 (1949); Broad & Brandford
Place Corp. v. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (1944).
5 Moe v. Gier, 116 Cal. App. 403, 2 P.2d 852 (1931).
8 "Any words in a sealed instrument by which a party manifests an inten-
tion to do or not to do an act, either by himself or a third person, if the act
be lawful, will make a covenant, and the law will hold him to his undertaking."
Hambly v. Delaware, M. & V.R. Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 541, 551 (C.C.D. Del. 1884).
7 Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 148, 279 Pac. 546 (1929).
8 Broad & Brandford Place Corp. v. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d
80 (1944).
9A statement in a warranty deed that the tract, conveyed contained 830
acres was held to be a mere representation or opinion of grantor and not a
covenant in Corraugh v. Hamill, 110 Mo. App. 53, 84 S.W. 96 (1904). A provi-
sion in a lease that the lessee should give written notice sixty days before
expiration of the lease if he desired an extension was held not to be a covenant;
so that a provision that in the case of default in the performance of any
covenant the acceptance of rent by the lessor or his failure to reenter should
not be a waiver of his right to terminate the lease did not prevent lessor's
acceptance of the rent after the expiration of the lease from amounting to a
waiver of the requirement of the sixty days written notice by the lessee of his
election to extend the lease. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 64 A.2d 44(1949).
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1955], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol57/iss1/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In order to have a covenant it was at one time considered
necessary that there be a writing under seal. The statute of 32
Hen. VIII, c. 3410 applied in terms to covenants in "indentures of
lease" which had been under seal only, and consequently where
the running of a covenant was dependent upon that statute it was
considered necessary that the instrument containing the covenant
be under seal.11 But in the Conveyancing Act of 188112 the
restriction as to indentures was removed.
The requirement as to a seal has rarely been referred to in
this country and in common parlance a covenant can mean any
agreement whether under seal or not.13 Of the many statutes in
this country patterned after the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34 only
the New Jersey statute has a like restriction as to indentures of
lease and it is over a century old.14 Although the general statement
that a covenant is a promise under seal is occasionally seen in the
cases,' 5 it has been stated that there is no holding that a seal is a
necessary element in a covenant, 0 and now when a seal is referred
to, it is generally referred to as being at least optional. 7 However,
in an early West Virginia case it was distinctly stated that a
covenant real must be under seal as its very name imparts.'8 But
in West Virginia, and in many other states, where the necessity of a
seal has been largely dispensed with by statute, 9 the absence of a
seal on the instrument would no doubt be immaterial today.
Indeed, it would seem that not only is a seal no longer neces-
sary to the validity of a covenant, but the covenant need not even
10 This statute was enacted in England in 1540 for the purpose of making
certain covenants run with the land.
11 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 125 (3d ed. 1939).
1244-45 VIcr., c. 41, §§ 10, 11 (1881).
13 Jenkins v. Taylor Dry Goods Co., 352 Mo. 660, 179 S.W.2d 54, 58 (1944).
14 NJ. REv. STATS. 46:8-2-3 (1937).
15Schram v. Coyne, 127 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1942); Petty v. Board of Trustees,
70 Ind. 290, 297 (1880); Broad & Brandford Place Corp. v. Hockenjos Co., 132
NJ.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (1944).16 "No court in this country, it is believed, has denied the running of a
covenant because the latter was not under seal, and it would be a distinct
shock if one should." Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its Ame'rican
Aspects, 37 YAIE L.J. 1, 23 (1927).
17 "A covenant is a promise, an agreement or a contract; formerly it was a
contract under seal." Jenkins v. Taylor Dry Goods Co., 352 Mo. 660, 179 S.W.2d
54 (1944). "Any words importing an agreement in writing, whether sealed or
unsealed, is a covenant." Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 138, 279 Pac. 546 (1929).
18 Lydick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 W. Va. 427, 442 (1880).
19 "The affixing of a seal, or any symbol or word intended to have the
effect of a seal, to any instrument conveying or agreeing to convey land, or any
interest whatever in land, shall not give to such instrument any additional force
or effect, either by way of importing a consideration or any other manner what-
soever, either at law, or in equity, than such instrument would have if it were
unsealed." W. VA. CODE c. 36, art. 4, § 3 (Michie, 1949). This statute was first
enacted in 1923.
3
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be in writing, although here again we find general statements that
a covenant is an agreement in writing.20 Covenants in parole leases
have been held enforceable; 21 and in speaking of one case where
this was done, a noted authority on covenants stated that it was
immaterial whether the lease was under seal or merely parole.22
To make oral covenants binding and even to make them run with
the land has not bothered the courts in so far as the burden of
stipulations in grants in fee by deeds poll are concerned. Such is
the weight of authority in this country.23 As a matter of fact, many
of the modern adaptations of the aforementioned statute of Henry
VIII are very general in their language and have nothing in them
which would necessarily restrict their application to written leases. 4
Of course, many states have statutes which generally require deeds
conveying real estate or leases thereof for long terms to be in
writing to be valid, and in such cases it would naturally follow
that any covenants in such conveyances would generally have to be
in writing to be valid.25 But the very fact that short term leases
may be created by parole leads to the conclusion that parole
covenants are effective.
As a further indication that covenants need not be in writing,
and this would probably extend to cases where the instrument of
20 Guild v. Wallis, 130 Ore. 138, 279 Pac. 546 (1929).
21Where the lessor in a parole lease covenanted to repair, the covenant
was held effective and to run with the land in Hight v. McCulloch, 150 Tenn.
117, 263 S.W. 794 (1924); and where the lessor prepared a lease, which was
never executed, with a covenant to pay for all the lessee's property on the leased
premises at the end of the term, the covenant was held not only to be an
effective covenant between the parties but one which ran with the land in
Mansel v. Norton, 22 Ch. D. 769 (1883). In the West Virginia case of Lydick
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 W. Va. 427, 442 (1880) the court stated, "Of
course a parol contract cannot be a covenant real, and therefore it cannot
run with the land, and cannot therefore be sued on in a court of law by the
grantee of the land which it affects." However, the court added, "But when-
ever the nature of the agreement is such, that it would have passed with the
land, had it been sealed, subsequent purchasers of the estate to which it
relates, who are substantially and beneficially interested in its performance,
may enforce it in equity." Would the West Virginia statute abolishing the
effect of a seal in an instrument conveying any interest in land, note 19 supra,
have the effect of making a parole covenant enforceable in a court of law in
West Virginia today? See also Lucas v. Smithfield, C. & H.F. Turnpike Co.,
36 W. Va. 427, 15 SE. 182 (1892).
But see Petty v. Board of Trustees, 70 Ind. 290, 297 (1880), where the
court, speaking of a covenant in a simple contract, stated that there was no
such thing in legal parlance as a covenant which is not in writing.
22 SrMS, COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 90 (1901).
23Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its American Aspects, 37 YALE-
L.J. 1, 23 (1927).
24 Many of the statutes use general language to the effect that alienees of
of lessors and lessees shall have the same legal remedies in relation to the
land as their principals. E.g., IND. STATS. §3-1625 (Burns, 1933, 1953 Replace-
ment); and KAN. GEN. STAT. § 67-516 (1949).
25 E.g., W. VA. CODE c. 36, art. 1, §§ 1, 3 (Michie, 1949).
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conveyance itself is required by statute to be in writing, there is
extensive authority for the proposition that covenants may be
implied;26 and the effect of an implied covenant is as extensive
as that of an express covenant.27 Implied covenants depend for
their existence upon the intention of the parties to the transaction
and construction of law. It is not sufficient to say that an implied
covenant is necessary in order to make the transaction fair, or that
in the absence of such covenant it would be improvident or unwise,
but it must arise from the presumed intention of the parties as
gathered from the instrument as a whole.2 s There may even be
implied covenants in an instrument where there are express
covenants, but there can be none contradictory to or inconsistent
with or repugnant to express covenants, nor to the expressed inten-
tion of the parties.29
If the law will enforce a covenant which is unexpressed,
either by writing or by parole, simply because it is presumed that
the parties intended it to be a part of their agreement, there is
ground for saying that the law will enforce a. covenant which is
expressed, though merely by parole.
The purpose of covenants in conveyances of land or estates
therein is to establish the mutual obligations of the parties to the
conveyance in regard to the land or estate conveyed. The promises
and agreements have the immediate effect of being binding upon
the parties if the instrument of conveyance is properly executed
because of the privity of contract which exists between them. But
upon a subsequent conveyance of the land or estate there exists
no privity of contract between the original covenantor or covenan-
tee and the then owner of the land or estate, the ones then interested
in the subject matter of the covenant. To remedy this situation
it became necessary for the law to develop some theory upon which
these promises and agreements could be enforced by or against
remote parties so that the person who made the covenant would be
liable in case of a breach to the person interested in enforcing it.
26 A covenant for quiet enjoyment is implied in a lease. Johnson v. Mis-
souri, Kansas, Texas R.R., 216 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1949); Mayor v. Mabie, 13
N.Y. 151 (1855); Headley v. Hoopengarner, 60 W. Va. 626, 55 S.E. 755 (1906).
Covenant to develop premises is implied in an oil and gas lease. Brimmer v.
Union Oil Co. of Calif., 81 F.2d 437 (1936). Covenant to deliver possession is
implied in a lease. Goldman v. Dieves, 159 Wis. 47, 149 N.W. 713 (1914). See
21 G.J.S., Covenants § 14 (1936); Notes, 137 A.L.R. 4408 (1941), 62 A.L.R. 1257(1928).
27 Mayor v. Mabie, 13 N.Y. 151 (1885).
2s Danciger Oil & Refinery Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 490, 154 S.W.2d
632, 635 (1941). .
29 Hambly v. Delaware, W. & R. Co., 21 Fed. Cas. 541 (C.C.D. Del. 1884);
Johnson v. Missouri, Kansas, Texas R.R., 216 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. 1949).
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This has been done on the theory that some covenants run with
the land. How this developed with regard to transfers in fee is
outside the scope of this paper, as its primary purpose is a con-
sideration of covenants which run with the land in leases in
general and covenants which run with the land in leases in West
Virginia in particular.
Having given some slight consideration to the general aspects
of covenants such as their meaning, characteristics and purpose,
and without having attempted to mention any of the other aspects
of covenants or to go into any great detail in regard to the aspects
considered, the rest of the paper will be devoted to covenants in
leases.
Nature of a Lease
While a lease is often referred to as a "contract of lease", this
is, to some extent, a misnomer because a lease is generally recog-
nized as a conveyance, not a contract. "0
In its primary sense a lease is a conveyance of any lands or
tenements, usually in consideration of rent or other recompense,
made for life, for years or at will, but always for a less time than
that which the lessor has in the premises.31 But the word lease
is often used in other senses, and when one speaks of covenants
in a lease one is not referring to the estates created by a lease but
the instrument or contract by which the parties create the estates.
In this sense it is believed that the term "contract of lease" may be
properly used, but the writer will, in general and for the sake of
convenience, do as others generally do, and use the word lease itself
in referring to the instrument or contract in which the covenants are
incorporated as well as in its primary sense.
It is quite often difficult to distinguish a lease by which the
relationship of lessor and lessee is established from other agreements
which establish other types of relationships. For that reason there
is confusion in the cases as to whether an agreement creates the
relationship of lessor and lessee or a mere license which excuses an
act done on the property of another which would otherwise be a
trespass. 32 Unlike a lease, a license conveys -no interest in the
30 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 74 (3d ed. 1939).
31 Simth v. Payne, 153 Va. 746, 151 S.E. 295 (1930); Greene Line Terminal Co.
v. Martin, 122 W. Va. 483, 10 S.E.2d 901 (1940).
32 Baseball Publishing Co. v. Bruton, 302 Mass. 54, 18 N.E.2d 362 (1938).
6
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premises and is revocable at the will of the licensor, and such revo-
cation will terminate the licensee's right to the premises.-
There is also confusion as to whether certain agreements
establish the lessor-lessee relationship or that of employer-employee.
Typical of these cases is the agreement whereby one agrees to
cultivate the land of another, receiving as his compensation a share
of the crops. Such an agreement can create either of the above
named relationships, and which of them is actually created in a
given case is dependent generally upon the amount of control
retained by the owner of the premises over the premises, crops
and the other party to the agreement." 4
In another situation, where one acquires possession of property
through an instrument whereby he agrees to pay a stipulated sum
at intervals as rental for the premises for a term, the aggregate of
such sums usually being the value of the property, there being in
the instrument an option to purchase the property at the end of the
term for the sum of one dollar, there is a split of authority as to
whether this creates the relationship of lessor and lessee or is merely
a contract to sell and purchase with payments in instalments. The
weight of authority favors the latter view, even if the instrument
purports to be a lease with an option to purchase, if the so-called
rentals are sufficient, when paid through the term, to cover the
purchase price. "5  The payment of the one dollar as additional
purchase price is overlooked as inconsequential. In an early case
the West Virginia court indicated that it would follow this view
when it stated that such a contract was "plainly a contract of
:1.A.L.I. RESrATEMENT, TORTS §§ 176, 177 (1934). In Baseball Publishing
Co. v. Bruton, note 32 supra, the court stated, "The revocation of a license may
constitute a breach of contract, and give rise to an action for damages. But it
is none the less effective to deprive the licensee of all justification for entering
or remaining upon the land."
34Carlson v. Industrial 'Accident Commission, 294 Pac. 399 (Cal. 1930),
rev'd 213 Cal. 287, 2 P.2d 151 (1931), certiorari denied, 284 U.S. 681 (1931). In
this case the lower court had held that the agreement created the relationship
of lessor and lessee. This holding was reversed in the appellate court because
of the fact that the retention of the title to the crop by the owner of the
premises and the extent of control given him by the instrument constituted
the relationship one of employer and employee. In Angel v. Black Band Consol.
Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 47, 122 S.E. 274 (1924), the court held that there could
be both a relationship of employer and employee and one of landlord and
tenant. There the employer maintained houses at a financial loss for such
employees as desired to live therein, deducting the rent and electricity charge
from the employees' wages. Plaintiff and others quit work and went on a
strike. In an action for forcible eviction against the defendant employer, the
court held that plaintiff was an employee in regard to his mining coal, but a
tenant in regard to his occupancy of the house which belonged to the defendant.
55 Mahoney v. San Francisco, 201 Cal. 248, 257 Pac. 49 (1927); Baltimore &
Ohio S.W.R.R. v. People, 200 Il1, 541, 66 N.E. 148 (1902); Billings v. Bankers'
Bond Co., 199 Ky. 490, 251 S.W. 643 (1923); Note, 71 A.L.R. 1318 (1929).
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purchase in legal effect"." This was probably obiter dictum since
the court indicated that it would reach the same result it did reach
whether the instrument was a lease or contract of purchase. It
might be said that the court gave some weight to the fact that the
contract was twice designated as a contract of purchase in a paper
made a part of the contract, but it is generally held that what the
parties call the contract is not determinative in any case, as the court
will look to the instrument as a whole and determine what it is in
fact.37 In a very recent West Virginia case, 8 however, the court with-
out mentioning the Spilman case,3 9 held that such an instrument was
a lease with an option to purchase.40
Also a lodger is to be distinguished from a tenant or lessee.
Whether a person who is paying compensation for the use of a
room in the home of another is one or the other is dependent upon
the agreement between the parties. 4'
It is often important to establish the type relationship existing
between the parties, because a different law may be applied de-
pendent upon the relationship. If it is not that of lessor and
lessee, the law of contracts will generally be applied, while if it is,
the law of landlord and tenant will be applicable. A leasehold
estate being a sort of hybrid estate, that is, it is an interest in land
yet it is personal property,42 is governed by a hybrid type of law,
that of landlord and tenant, which is neither wholly contract law
nor wholly real property law.4 3
Covenants in Leases
When a leasehold estate is created, the lessor or owner carves
the estate in fee into two separate estates or interests by conveying
38 Spilman v. City of Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 650, 14 S.E. 279 (1891).
37 Baseball Publishing Co. v. Bruton, 302 Mass. 54, 18 N.E.2d 362 (1938);
Lynch v. Robert P. Murray Hotel Co., 130 App. Div. 691, 115 N.Y.Supp. 465
(1909)38 First Huntington National Bank v. Gideon Broh Realty Co., 79 S.E.2d
675 (W. Va. 1953).
a9 See note 36 supra.
40 The court went on to hold that the option to purchase in the lease was
void under the rule against perpetuities.
41 "The chief distinction between a tenant and a lodger apparently rests
in the character of the possession. A tenant has the exclusive legal possession
of the premises; he and not the landlord being in control and responsible for
the care and condition of the premises. A lodger, on the other hand, has
merely a right to the use of the premises; the landlord retaining the control
and being responsible for the care and attention necessary and retaining the
right of access to the premises for such purpose." Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo.
App. 789, 84 S.W.2d 947, 955 (1935). See also Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn.
263, 85 Atl. 529 (1912); Dewar v. Minneapolis Lodge, 155 Minn. 98, 192 N.W.
358 (1923).
42 Greene Line Terminal Co. v. Martin, 122 W. Va. 483, 10 S.E.2d 901 (1940).
433 WLL rON, Co-triArs § 890 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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an interest in the land to the lessee. 4" This interest is an estate in
land and is called an "estate for years" or "leasehold estate". In so
doing the lessor ceases to have an estate in possession and only
reserves to himself an estate in reversion.4 5 Thus there are created
two estates, the leasehold estate and reversionary estate, one in
privity with the other. One of these estates, the leasehold estate,
will terminate at some future date leaving only one estate, the fee,
in the hands of the owner of what was the reversionary estate. One
person gives up something which he expects to get back at some
future time and therefore he has a continuing interest in the estate
conveyed. In this respect it is quite different from a conveyance
in fee where the grantor reserves no interest and is therefore not
concerned with the estate after he conveys it.
Because of the nature of a lease the covenants in the instrument
creating the two estates become very important. The dual estates
so created make it necessary that there be an understanding between
the parties as to their obligations during the continuance of their
relationship as the result of the creation of such interrelated
estates, and so they generally agree as to what each is to do or not
do in regard to the premises. The promises and agreements so
made are referred to as covenants. In fact, certain covenants are
so necessary in such case that if they are not expressly made they
will be implied by law.46
Since the law does not favor restraints upon the alienation of
esiates in property, and as a result the lessor can freely transfer his
reversion, 7 and, as will be pointed out later, the lessee can usually
transfer his leasehold interest, it is also necessary, in order that such
covenants be fully effective, that covenants in a lease run with the
land so that the assigns of either will have the benefit, and bear the
burden, of such covenants. Otherwise, in many instances the
lessor would find a stranger in rightful possession of his land against
whom he would have no remedy in case the terms of the lease were
not complied with, or the lessee, or his assigns, would find that the
44 Ibid. That a leasehold estate is an interest in land will be the subject
of a more detailed discussion later in this paper. See notes 277-279, infra,
for authorities.
45"The reversion is that estate which is left when from the entire fee a
lesser particular estate in being is granted. Stinson v. Rouse, 52 Me. 261. It is
that present, vested, alienable, inheritable, and devisable residue of an estate
remaining in a grantor or his successors, or in the successors of a testator, to
be enjoyed in possession, from and after the happening of a particular event,
at some future time." Johnson v. Palmer, 118 Me. 226, 230, 107 At. 291, 293(1919).
4 See note 26 supra.
472 TwFANY, REL PROPERTY § 313 (3d ed. 1939).
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lessor's interest had been transferred to a stranger and many of the
benefits of the lease would be unenforceable as a practical matter.
In so far as covenants in the lease run with the land, this difficulty
is avoided since the holder of the reversion or of the leasehold
interest would be bound by those covenants.
No attempt will be made here to give a complete definition of
the term "covenants which run with the land". Such a definition
would be difficult to put into a few words, and what is and what
is not such a covenant will be the theme of a large part of this
paper. It will suffice to say at this time that a covenant which runs
with the land is a covenant which can be enforced by or against
remote parties. Such a covenant is sometimes said by courts to be
one which is attached to the land in such a manner as to be an
incident to the ownership of the land so that the right to enforce it
or the liability under it passes with the land conveyed. 4 While
there seems to be a similarity between the running of a covenant
and the assignment of rights under the covenant, the two situations
are entirely distinct. The covenant which runs with the land does
so because it is an incident to the ownership of the interest in land
conveyed and can be enforced by the present owner of the interest
even though he is a remote party. In the case of an assignment of
rights under the covenant, the benefit of the covenant passes to the
assignee solely because of a derivative privity of contract. The
assignment of the rights under the covenant confers the benefit of
the covenant to the assignee and rests upon the privity of contract
existing between the assignor and the covenantor and is derivative,
not direct. Further, only the benefits of a covenant are passed by
such an assignment and not the burdens, while in the case of
covenants which run with the land, both the benefits and the
burdens may pass to the assignee, depending upon whether the
transferee of the particular estate is the assignee of the covenantee
or the covenantor.4 9  When the covenant runs with the land, the
transfer of the estate carries with it the benefit or the burden of
the covenant without the necessity of an assignment, or even the
mention of the covenant. 0 This is true even though the transfer
of the estate does not relieve the original covenantor of the burden
of the covenant since he is bound to the covenantee and his assigns
by privity of contract.5'
48 Abbott, Covenants in a Lease Which Run with the Land, 31 YALE L.J.
127 (1921).
49 Ibid.
50 Kirby v. Goldman, 270 Mass. 444, 170 N.E. 414 (1930).
51Abbott, Covenants in a Lease Which Run with the Land, note 48 supra
10
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The aforementioned statute of Hen. VIII purported to give
remedies to the lessor or his assigns against the lessee and his as-
signs, and, conversely, remedies to the lessee or his assigns against
the lessor or his assigns. The mutuality of the remedy conferred
by the statute rests only on privity of estate and, since it is only
effective where there is no privity of contract, it continues only so
long as such privity exists unless there is an assumption of the
burdens of the covenants in the lease by the assignee which
establishes privity of contract.52 Since this is true, the assignee of
either of the original parties can escape liability by severing the
privity of the estate. This can be accomplished by reassigning
the estate previously assigned to him.53 He can escape the liability
which rests solely on privity of estate by such assignment to another
party even though his express object in doing so is to escape
liability under the covenants in the lease which run with the land. 4
This type of privity then, which arises only because the two parties
have simultaneous interests in the same land, is entirely different
from privity of contract in that it can be severed by the act of one
of the parties without the consent or concurrence of the other.
It would seem that when we speak of covenants running with
the land we are speaking of covenants running with the estate or
interest conveyed. Such covenants are covenants which are so
attached to the land that the right to enforce them, or the obliga-
tion to perform them, passes with the estate conveyed as an incident
of ownership.55 On the transfer of the leasehold estate or the
estate in reversion, the transferee takes the estate subject to the
burden of certain covenants or with the benefit of certain covenants.
Since there is no privity of contract upon which to base a
personal action for damages, the courts must work out some kind
of privity between an assignee of the covenantee and the covenantor
or his assigns before there can be an action by one against the
other. Thus we have the privity of estate basis for such an action.
It should be pointed out that it is a serious matter to impose
52 68 Beacon St. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935).
53 Kirby v. Goldman, 270 Mass. 444. 170 N.E. 414 (1930); Tate v. McCormick,
23 Hun. 218 (N.Y. 1880); Sander v. Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc., 20 Tenn. App.
107, 95 S.W.2d 1266 (1936).
54 Fensterwald v. Samet, 138 Md. 201, 113 Atl. 750 (1921); McMorris v.
Keeley Real Estate Co., 147 Mo. App. 667, 127 S.W. 411 (1911). In these cases
it was held that a reassignment of a lease to an inolvent rag picker or peddler
in order to get rid of burdensome covenants was effective as long as there was
a valid assignment and not a sham or bogus transfer. The same would pre-
sumably be true in the case of a reassignment of the reversion, but such a case
is not likely to arise.
55 Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340 (1859); Abbott, Covenants in a
Lease Which Run with the Land, 31 YAIm L.J. 127 (1921).
11
Brown: Covenants in Leases in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955
COVENANTS IN LEASES
personal liability upon a person for the breach of a promise he
did not make. Accordingly, it is not surprising that not all
covenants are held to run with the land. The covenant must be
of the type which is so attached to the land as to be a part of the
estate conveyed, or of a type which the covenantee cannot, after
his assignment of the estate, take advantage of, and which is
beneficial to the assignee as such, or an action will not lie upon
the covenant merely because of privity of estate even though the
covenant is incorporated in a lease.56 In other words, a purely
personal covenant will not run with the estate conveyed.5 7 A
collateral, as distinguished from a real, covenant will not run with
the land and only the covenantee can have an action against the
covenantor for the breach of the covenant unless there is an assign-
ment of rights under the covenant to establish privity of contract. 8
A covenant is a covenant real and runs with the land only when
it attaches to the land or some interest therein actually granted
the covenantee or covenantor. 59 Or, as stated in other cases, if an in-
terest in land is conveyed and in the conveyance a covenant is made
to do an act which concerns the land and which thus becomes united
to it so that it affects the value of the land in whoseseever hands it
may come, it is a covenant real and runs with the land and the as-
signee may have the benefit of, or be liable to perform, the cove-
nant.60 But covenants in leases by which parties bind themselves to
do or not to do acts which in no way affect the use and enjoyment of
the demised premises are merely personal obligations between them-
selves and do not run with the land."' And if the covenant is
beneficial to the covenantee without regard to his continuing to
be the owner of the estate conveyed or reversion retained, it is a
mere collateral or personal covenant upon which the assignee can-
not sue.62 Even though the covenant may benefit the estate of the
covenantee, it is a personal covenant, rather than a real covenant,
if there is no privity of estate.6 3
There will be a further discussion later concerning the problem
56 Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Ald. 1, 106 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1821).
57Luray Caverns Co. v. Kaufman, 112 Va. 725, 72 S.E. 709 (1911); Mayor v.
Pattison, 10 East 130, 103 Eng. Rep. 725 (1808).
58 Ibid.
59Rawlings v. Fisher, 101 W. Va. 253, 132 S.E. 489 (1926); Tennant v.
Tennant, 69 W. Va. 28, 70 S.E. 851 (1911).
60 Mayor v. Pattison, 10 East 130, 103 Eng. Rep. 725 (1808); Lydick v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 W. Va. 335 (1880).
61.507 Madison Avenue Realty Co., Inc. v. Martin, 200 App. Div. 146, 192
N.Y. Supp. 762 (1922), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 683, 135 N.E. 969 (1922).
62 Vyvyan v. Arthur, 1 B. & C. 410, 107 Eng. Rep. 152 (1823); Vernon v. Smith,
5 B. & AId. 1, 106 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1821).
63 Hurxthal v. Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903).
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of whether there is a sufficient touching and concerning of the
estate by the covenant to make it a covenant real so as to run with
the land.
History of the Running of Covenants
For all practical purposes the running of covenants in leases
can be traced to the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, enacted by
Parliament in 1540. Whatever was the status of the law in this
regard prior to the enactment of this statute, and there is good
reason to believe that covenants in leases were held to run,6 many
courts broadly accept the view that the statute was the origin of
the running of covenants in leases and that they did not run at
common law. ", But a probable majority of the courts take the.
view that covenants did run with the leasehold at common law
although they did not run with the reversion.68
At the time of the enactment of this statute many lands which
had belonged to the monasteries and other religious organizations
had come into the possession of the king by operation of the mort-
main statutes, and the king had granted most of such land to various
favored subjects. A considerable amount of this land was subject
to leases made by the religious organizations which contained many
covenants and provisions for the benefit of the lessors. Coming to
the king by forfeiture as the land did, the king and his grantees
lost many of these rights in the property. They could not claim
rights under the covenants or conditions in the leases for these all
required a privity, or at least a personal succession to be enforceable
Thus it will be seen that there was more reason for the passage of a
law allowing actions on covenants in this situation than in the
ordinary situation where there was at least personal succession
between the parties. The king's interest had already been pro-
tected by 31 Hen. VIII, c. 13, §§ 1-2 (1539), but still a way of
transferring the rights of the king to his grantees was needed.
7
This was the situation which the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, was
enacted to remedy6 S
64 SIMs, COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 58 (1901); 1 TIFFANY, REAL
'ROPERTY § 125 (3d ed. 1939).
(15 SIMS, COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 58 (1901).
66 Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340 (1859); Bream v. Dickinson, 2
Hump. 126, 21 Tenn. 126 (1840); Magoon v. Eastman, 86 Vt. 261, 84 Atl. 869
(1912); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 158a (1910).
67 See Co. Lrrr. 21a.
68 32 HEN. VIII, c. 34, 1540: "Where before this time divers, as well temporal
as ecclesiastical and religious persons, have made sundry leases, demises and
grants to divers other persons, of sundry manors, lordships, ferms, meases, lands,
tenements, meadows, pastures, or other hereditaments, for term of life or
lives, or for term of years, by writing under their seal or seals, containing
13
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It is dear from a reading of the statute that it was intended
to apply only to leases, but this intention, like many other reason-
ably apparent intentions of law-making bodies, has not been carried
certain conditions, covenants and agreements to be performed, as well on the
part and behalf of the said lessees and grantees, their executors and assigns,
as on the behalf of the said lessors and grantors, their heirs and successors;
(ii) and forasmuch as by the common law of this realm, no stranger to any
covenant, action or condition, shall take any advantage or benefit of the same,
by any means or ways in the law, but only such as be parties or privies there-
unto, by the reason whereof, as well all grantees of reversions, as also all grantees
and patentees of the King our sovereign lord, of sundry manors, lordships,
granges, ferms, meases, lands, tenements, meadows, pastures or other heredita-
ments late belonging to monasteries, and other religious ecclesiastical houses
dissolved, suppressed, renounced, relinquished, forfeited, given up, or by other
means come to the hands and possession of the King's majesty since the fourth
day of February the seven and twentieth year of his most noble reign, be
excluded to have any entry or action against the said lessees and grantees, their
executors or assigns, which the lessors before that time might by the law have
had against the same lessees for the breach of any condition,' covenant or
agreement comprised in the indentures of their said leases, demises and grants:
(iii) be it therefore enacted by the King our sovereign lord, the lords spiritual
and temporal, and the commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by
authority of the same, That as well all and every person and persons, and
bodies politic, their heirs, successors and assigns, which have or shall have any
gift or grant of our said sovereign lord by his letters patents of any lordships,
manors, -lands, tenements, rents, parsonages, tithes, portions, or any other
hereditaments, or of any reversion or reversions of the same, which did belong
or appertain to any of the said monasteries, and other religious and ecclesiastical
houses, dissolved, suppressed, relinquished, forfeited, or by any other means
come to the King's hands since the said fourth day of February the seven and
twentieth year of his noble reign, or which at any time heretofore did belong
or appertain to any other person or persons, and after came to the hands of
our said sovereign lord, (iv) as also all other persons being grantees or assignees
to or by our said sovereign lord the King, or to or by any other person or
persons than the King's highness, and the heirs, executors, successors, and
assigns of every one of them, (v) shall and may have and enjoy like advantages
against the lessees their executors, administrators and assigns, by entry for
non-payment of the rent, or for doing of waste or other forefeiture; (vi) and
also shall and may have and enjoy all and every such like, and the same
advantage, benefit and remedies by action only, for not performing of other
conditions, covenants or agreements contained and expressed in the indentures
of their said leases, demises or grants, against all and every the said lessees and
farmers and grantees, their executors and administrators and assigns, as the
said lessors or grantors themselves, or their heirs or successors, ought, should,
or might have had and enjoyed at any time or times; (vii) in like manner
and form as if the reversion of such lands, tenements or hereditaments had not
come to the hands of our said sovereign lord, or as our said sovereign lord,
his heirs and successors, should or might have had and enjoyed in certain cases,
by virtue of the act made at the first session of this present parliament, if no
such grant by letters patents had been made by his Highness.
"II. Moreover be it enacted by authority aforesaid, That all farmers
lessees and grantees of lordships, manors, lands, tenements, rents, parsonages,
tithes, portions, or any other hereditaments, for term of years life or lives,
their executors, administrators and assigns, shall and may have like action,
advantage and remedy against all and every person and persons and bodies
politic, their heirs, successors and assigns, which have or shall have any gift
or grant of the King our sovereign lord, or of any other person or persons,
of the reversion of the same manors, lands, tenements, and other hereditaments
so letten, or any parcel thereof, for any condition, covenant or agreement con-
tained or expressed in the indentures of their lease and leases, as the same
lessees, or any of them might and should have had against the said lessors and
14
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out and many courts have based their holdings that covenants in
conveyances in fee run with the land upon this statute.69
An analysis of the statute shows that it purported to give to
the grantees of the king, and to the grantees of any other person,
any right of entry for nonpayment of rent, waste or other forfeiture,
and the benefit of any condition, covenant or agreement in the
lease, which the original lessor had. These rights extended to the
assigns of the king, or lessor, but the burdens created by these
rights extended to the assigns of the lessee only if the original
lessor would have had such rights against them.
So, while the motivating purpose of the statute was to benefit
the grantees and assigns of the king, it was broad enough to give
the assignees of any land which was subject to a lease the benefit
of the terms of the lease. Whatever was the state of the common
law with regard to the running of covenants in leases with the
reversion, here was a statute broad enough in terms to make them
run, at least so far as the benefits were concerned.
Even in 1540 it apparently was thought necessary to give some-
thing to the other side in order to get a statute enacted, and,
interestingly enough, one which the king and the lords wanted
passed. It has been noted that in the first part of the statute the
benefits extended to others than the king's grantees, and it will
be noticed that the second pari was for the benefit of the lessees,
possibly so that the statute would not appear to be too one-sided.
And the language in the second part of the statute seems broad
enough to make the burdens of covenants in leases run with the
reversion so that the grantees of the king, and assigns of lessors,
would be bound by them since it purports to give lessees and their
assigns the benefit of covenants against the grantees of the king
and assignees of other persons which the lessee had against the
original lessors. However, if the view that covenants run with
the leasehold, but not with the reversion,7 0 is accepted, then the
lessees obtained nothing by the statute, in so far as the running
of the benefits of covenants is concerned, which they did not
grantors, their heirs and successors; (ii) all benefits and advantages of recoveries
in value by reason of any warranty in deed or in law by voucher or otherwise
only excepted." See Sims, COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 71 et seq.
09 Or at least these cases base their holdings upon the law laid down in
Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583), which was a lease case
and is generally considered to have construed this statute. See note 74 infra.
See Maryland & P. R.R. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73 Ati. 297 (1909); Burbank
v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475 (1869); Kellogg v. Robinson, 6 Vt. 276 (1834); CLAU,
COVENANTS AND INTEREss RUNNING wrrH THE LAND 96 (2d ed. 1947).
70 See note 66 supra.
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already have, but the statute did aid them in making the burdens
run as against the assigns of the lessor.
While the subject of the running of benefits and burdens in
leases will be dealt with in detail later, it is important now to see
what effect the statute had on the problem in order to compare
later the statute as enacted and interpreted. If a covenant runs
with the land it is difficult to see how its benefits can run without
its burdens also running, or vice versa, but it seems to be entirely
possible for them to do so.7
1
In the statute the grantees of the king or lessors were given
the same rights on all covenants and conditions in the lease against
the lessees or their assigns which the original lessors might have had,
but they were. not given any rights which the original lessors did
not have. In other words, for the assigns of the lessor to have a
right or benefit under a covenant in a lease against assigns of the
lessee, the lessor himself must have had this right against such
assigns. So if the original lessor did not have a right against the
assigns of the lessee, either by the terms of the lease or because the
burden of the covenant ran with the land and bound the assigns
of the lessee, then the assigns of the lessor were given no rights
under the statute against such assigns of the lessee. The statute
made the benefit of the covenant run so that the assigns of the
lessor received what benefits the lessor had, but the burden of the
lessee's covenant stood still and remained with the original covenan-
tor, the lessee, even though the lessee had assigned his estate. So,
in order for the lessor, the original covenantee, and his assigns to
be able to enforce the burden of the covenant against the assigns
of the lessee, the original covenantor, it was necessary that (1) the
lease in terms bound the assigns of the lessee, or (2) the common
law made such burden run with the land, or (3) the courts
interpreted the statute as making the burden run.
Another aspect of the statute was that it did not in any way
distinguish between conditions, covenants or agreements. There-
fore, it would seem that the probable intent of Parliament was to
make available to the assigns of lessors and lessees all the benefits
to which their assignors were entitled, irrespective of whether they
were covenants, conditions or agreements. And there was nothing
in the statute to indicate that the subject matter of the covenant,
condition or agreement should be in existence when the conveyance
was made in order that the assign should be entitled to its benefit,
71 CLARK, COVENANTS AN INTERESTS RUNNING wITH THE LAND 102 (2d ed.
1947).
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nor any indication of an intent that the mention or non-mention
of assigns in the instrument of conveyance should have any effect,
nor that the covenant, condition or agreement should be required
to concern the land in order for such benefit to pass to the assigns.
The statute, in general terms, was apparently meant to put the
assigns of the lessor and lessee in the place of, and give them the
rights of, and, in some cases, more rights than, their assignors in
so far as benefits under the lease were concerned.
But the statute had only been in existence forty-two years when
the now famous Spencer's Case72 was decided. In that case the
court held that a covenant did not run with the land unless certain
conditions existed and thus put very definite limitations on the
effect of the statute of Hen. VIII. 3 Whether or not Lord Coke was
correct in holding as he did in that case, the case, even more than
the statute it interpreted, became the basis for the running of
covenants in conveyances of land, and in any article dealing with
the running of covenants more than passing notice must be given
to it.
However, it should be pointed out, as it seldom is, that
Spencer's Case may not have been intended to be an interpretation
of the statute of Hen. VIII. There was no mention of the statute
in the case at any point, and the statute was not applicable to the
facts of the case. The lessee had covenanted to build a brick wall
on the demised premises and assigned the lease to defendant's
assignor who had assigned it to defendant, the wall not having
been built. The lease did not purport to bind the assigns of the
lessee. The original lessor brought an action against defendant
for breach of the covenant. As stated above, the statute did not
purport to enlarge the rights of the lessor, or for that matter to
give the assigns of the lessor any greater rights than the lessor had,
but only purported to give these assigns the same benefits that the
lessor had. So there was really no reason for the court to mention
the statute as the lessor only had a right of action against the
assignee of the lessee if he had such a right at common law. Never-
theless, the case is generally considered as an interpretation of the
statute of Hen. VIII.7'
725 Co. Rep. 16, 1 Smith's Leading Cases 55 (11th ed.), 77 Eng. Rep. 72
(15873The extent to which the statute of Hen. VIII was modified by Spencer's
Case is discussed at length in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Jeckell,
124 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1941).
74Ibid; Purvis v. Shuman, 273 IUl. 286, 112 N.E. 679 (1916); SIMS, COVENANTS
AND INTEsTs RUNNING %vrrH THE IAN 109 (1901).
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But even at common law covenants were held to run with the
leasehold interest, if not with the reversion,7 5 and the court in
Spencer's Case stated that the burden of a covenant would ordinar-
ily run with the land, but it held that it would not run if the
subject matter of the covenant were not "in esse", unless assigns
were named. In other words, the subject matter of the covenant
had to be in being at the time of the conveyance, when the
covenant was made, or assigns had to be named, for the covenant
to be binding on the assigns of the covenantor.76
Having decided this, which decided the case before it, the
court went on to lay down other rules in the form of resolutions
as to the running of covenants. The court stated that a covenant
such as the one involved in that case, although the subject matter
of the covenant was not in esse, could run with the land so as to
bind the assigns of the covenantor if the covenantor had covenanted
for himself and his assigns, and that the assigns of the covenantee
would be entitled to the benefits of the covenant if it were made
to the covenantee and his assigns.7 7 Thus it made a great difference
in the running of covenants whether the word "assigns" was used
in the instrument of conveyance, and apparently, to make both
the benefits and the burdens of the covenant run, the word must
be used twice if the subject matter of the covenant were not in
existence when the covenant was made. Otherwise, if the covenant
were made by the covenantor for himself and his assigns, or to the
75 See note 66 supra.
76 The first resolution in Spencer's Case: "1. When the covenant extends
to a thing in esse, parcel of the demise, the thing to be done by force of the
covenant is quodamodo annexed and appurtenant to the thing demised, and
shall go with the land, and shall bind the assignee although he be not bound by
express words: but when the covenant extends to a thing which is not in being
at the time of the demise made, it cannot be appurtenant or annexed to the
thing which hath no being: as if the lessee covenants to repair the houses
demised to him during the term, that is parcel of the contract, and extends
to the support of the thing demised, and therefore is quodanodo annexed
appurtenant to houses, and shall bind the assignee although lie be not bound
expressly by the covenant: but in the case at bar, the covenant concerns a
thing which was not in esse at the time of the demise made, but to be newly
built after, and therefore shall bind the covenantor, his executors or adminis-
trators, and not the assignee, for the law will not annex the covenant to a
thing which hath no being."
77 The first part of the second resolution in Spencer's Case: "2. It was
resolved that in this case, if the lessee had covenanted for him and his assigns,
that they would make a new wall upon some part of the thing demised, that
for as much as it is to be done upon the land demised, that it would bind the
assignee; for although the covenant doth extend to a thing to be newly made,
yet it is to be made upon the thing demised, and the assignee is to take the
benefit of it, and therefore shall bind the assignee by express words. So on the
other side, if -a warranty be made to one, his heirs and assigns, by express
words, the assignee shall take benefit of it, and shall have a warrantia chartae,
F. N. B. 135, & 9 E. 2 Garr' de Charters 30, 36 . 3. Garr. 1. 4 H. 8. Dyer ."
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covenantee and his assigns, the burden only would run in the
first instance and the benefit only in the last, making it entirely
possible for the benefits to run without the burdens running and
vice versa.
The court further laid down the rule that in certain cases,
even though the subject matter of the covenant was in existence,
or, if not, and the covenantor had covenanted for himself and his
assigns to the covenantee and his assigns, the covenant would not
run if the thing to be done did not touch or concern the land
demised.78 In other words, if the covenant by the lessee in Spencer's
Case had been to build a fence on other land of the lessor, land
other than that leased to the lessee, then that covenant would not
have been binding upon the assigns of the lessee even though the
lessee had covenanted for himself and his assigns, nor would the
lessor's assigns have been able to enforce it had the covenant been
made to the lessor and his assigns. The covenant, in order that it
be held to run with the land, must be in regard to the very land
which is the subject matter of the conveyance in which the covenant
is made.
As stated above, there was nothing in the statute of Hen. VIII
that would restrict the running of covenants in leases to covenants
made in regard to things in existence at the time the covenant was
made, or to things which touch or concern the land which was the
subject matter of the lease; indeed, the language was broad enough
to include all covenants in the leasing instrument. But when the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, the mischief to be
remedied by the statute, is looked to, and this is one of the better
rules in the field of statutory construction'9 a good reason for the
78 The second part of the second resolution in Spencer's Case: "But although
the covenant be for him and his assigns, yet if the thing to be done be merely
collateral to the land, and doth not touch or concern the thing demised in any
sort, there the assignee shall not be charged. As if the lessee covenants for
him and his assigns to build a house upon the land of the lessor which is no
parcel of the demise, or to pay any collateral sum to the lessor, or to a stranger,
it shall not bind the assignee, because it is merely collateral, and in no manner
touches or concerns the thing that was demised, or that is assigned over; and
therefore in such case the assignee of the thing demised cannot be charged with
it, no more than any other stranger."
79In the leading case on the mischief-rule approach in statutory interpre-
tation and construction, decided a year after Spencer's Case, it was stated that
four things are to be considered in interpreting a statute. "1st. What was the
common law before the making of the Act. 2nd. What was the mischief and
defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the
Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the desease of the common-
wealth. And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all
the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for
continuance of the mischief, and proprivoto commodo, and to add force and
19
Brown: Covenants in Leases in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955
COVENANTS IN LEASES
latter rule can be seen. The mischief to be remedied was the fact
that covenants made in regard to things to be done or not to be
done on, or concerning, the land leased could not be enforced by
others than the original parties to the conveyance because of lack
of privity, of contract. Both the leasehold interest and the rever-
sionary interest being freely alienable, these interests often came
into the hands of others who might then need the benefit of such
covenants, and the original party might no longer be interested in
enforcing them. The grantees of the king were not interested in
enforcing covenants made by the lessee of the land granted to
them in regard to other land of the original lessor, but were
interested in enforcing the covenants in the leases of the land
which they and the lessees now owned in common, one the rever-
sionary interest and the other the leasehold interest. It may well be
that the reason that this is the only rule laid down in Spencer's
Case that has survived the test of time is because it is the only rule
of that case which had a firm foundation.
Requirements for the Running of Covenants
Before a covenant can be said to be one which can run with
the land it must comply with certain requirements. Since the time
Spencer's Case was decided, at least, the courts have used various
tests to determine whether a particular covenant could run with
the land. As has been shown, Spencer's Case laid down the re-
quirements that the subject matter of the covenant must be in esse,
or assigns named, and the covenant must touch or concern the land,
before it can run with the land. Some of these requirements are
held to be essential elements for the running of covenants yet
today. But some jurisdictions have expressly discarded some of
them as will appear later.
Another test often applied in order to determine whether a
covenant runs with the land is the intent of the original parties in
regard to the matter. While this cannot be a determining factor
in many cases, it does have considerable bearing in other cases.
And the courts generally hold that there must be privity of
estate before a covenant can run with the land. This is considered
by nearly all courts to be an essential element in the running of
covenants. This is easy to understand since before the question
of running of covenants can arise there must have been an assign-
life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act, pro bono publico." Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 634 (1584).
See also Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1945); Judd v. Laudin, 211
Minn. 465, 1 N.W.2d 861 (1942).
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ment of his interest by one of the original parties to a person who
was not a party to the instrument of lease. Thus a covenant in the
lease is sought to be enforced by or against one who is not in
privity of contract with the other and the basis of the action must
be privity of estate.
The "In Esse" and "Assigns" Rules
The rule that in order for a covenant in a lease to run with
the land the subject matter of the covenant must be in esse at the
time of the demise or leasing, or assigns be named, was carried over
from England to this country as the law in some states,80 but it has
now been discarded by most of the states as an unnecessary and
arbitrary rule,8 1 and covenants in a lease will run with the land
without regard to whether the subject matter of the covenant was in
existence at the time the demise was made.
However, the effect of this rule is not so easily lost and the
courts sometimes arrive at a decision because of it apparently with-
out realizing it. In a fairly recent West Virginia case 2 the court
stated that a covenant by the lessor that he would, at the end of
the term, pay the lessee for improvements which the lessee placed
on the premises was not a covenant which ran with the land. The
court did not give as a reason for its statement the fact that the
subject matter of the covenant was not in existence when the lease
was made, but it cited an old New York case 2 which does base
its decision on that ground. The West Virginia court also cited
two old Illinois cases ' 4 which based their holdings on the ground
that the improvements were not in existence when the lease was
made and cited Spencer's Case as authority for their holdings; and
the only other case cited by our court for this proposition was an
80Hansen v. Meyer, 81 Ill. 321, 25 Am. Rep. 282 (1876); Maryland &-
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73 Atl. 297 (1909); Thompson v.
Rose. 6 Cow. 302 (N.Y. 1826); Bream v. Dickerson, 2 Humph. 126 (Tenn. 1840).
N1 In Sexaur v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907), the court stated,
. the covenant may as well be said to be annexed, not to the thing not in
in esse, but to the land itself upon which the thing is to be made or done ......
In Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its American Aspects, 37 YALE. L.J. 1,
26, (1927), the author states, "The whole trend of modem decisions is against
the relevance of the existence or nonexistence of the subject matter of the
covenant". In Bald Eagle Valley R.R. v. Nittany Valley R.R., 171 Pa. 284,.
33 Atl. 239 (1895), the court criticized the rule as an arbitrary ancient rule like
that of Shelley's Case, Twyne's Case and others. See also Brown v. Southern
Pacific Co., 36 Ore. 128, 58 Pac. 1104 (1899).
82 Miami Cooperative Mining Co. v. Cherokee Coal Co., 96 W. Va. I1, 122
S.E. 286 (1924).
83 Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N.Y. 134 (1850).
84 Hansen v. Meyer, 81 Ill. 321, 25 Am. Rep. 282 (1876); Watson v. Gardner,
119 I1. 312, 10 N.E. 192 (1887).
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old Tennessee case8 5 which relied wholly upon Spencer's Case for
its holding. So our court in fairly recent times stated a rule of law,
dictum since it was not necessary to its decision," based, in effect,
on the in esse rule in Spencer's Case. It is interesting to note that
prior to the time the West Virginia case was decided, and subse-
quent to the time it decided the two cases cited by our court, the
Illinois court had held that the lessor's covenant to purchase im-
provements at the expiration of the term did run with the land
though assigns were not mentioned in the lease. The court stated,
"Whether there was ever any rational ground for a distinction be-
tween things which are or are not in esse when the covenant is
made where they do not concern the use and enjoyment of the
demised premises, there certainly is none where the covenant
directly concerns such use and enjoyment. 8 s7 In the West Virginia
case the improvements covenanted to be paid for were improve-
ments to be made to put a leased mine in condition to be operated
and so certainly the covenant directly concerned the use and enjoy-
ment of the demised premises.
If, as many courts hold, the in esse rule is no longer effective,
then the use of the words "and assigns" to make a covenant run in
regard to things not in existence is no longer useful as the covenant
will run as well without them as with them. This rule, like the
in esse rule, was carried over into this country,8 and then discarded
along with it in most jurisdictions. 9 But the use of this term
has other effects, e.g., to establish the intent of the parties-° as will
be pointed out later. It has been stated by the West Virginia court
fairly recently that the use of this term will have the effect of making
85 Bream v. Dickerson, 2 Humph. 126 (Tenn. 1840).
88 In the West Virginia case, note 82 supra, the only thing the court had to
decide was whether the lessee had the right to hold the premises after the
lease had terminated until it was paid for the' improvements it placed upon
the premises. Further, the lease contained a stipulation that the lease was to
terminate immediately upon a sale of the premises by the lessor, and so the
grantee of the lessor would not take the property subject to the lease and would
not be bound by its covenants.
87 Purvis v. Shuman, 273 Ill. 286, 298, 112 N.E. 679, 683 (1916).
as Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73 Ati. 297 (1909);
Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N.Y. 134 (1950).
89 In Brown v. Southern Pacific R.R., 36 Ore. 128, 58 Pac. 1104 (1899), the
court stated that the necessity of the word "assigns" originated at a time when
it was necessary to use the word "heirs" or other words of inheritance in order
to grant an estate in fee. See also Sexaur v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W.
941 (1907). But see W. VA. CODE c. 36, art. 4, §§ I and 17 (Michie, 1949), and
revisers' note following section 17, at notes 253, 254 and 255 infra.
90 Hart v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 291. N.Y 13, 50 N.E.2d 285 (1943).
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a covenant run with the land when it would not otherwise run in
a case which will be discussed in detail later.9'
Thus we see that in modern times, except for occasional un-
guarded statements, 92 the only rule laid down in Spencer's Case in
regard to leases of real property which has any real significance is
the rule that in order that a covenant in a lease run with the
land the covenant must touch or concern the land, meaning the
land which was the subject matter of the lease, and that this rule
is with us today is evidenced by numerous cases.93 But granting
this, still the effect of Spencer's Case was to put a limitation upon
the broad general terms of the statute of Hen. VIII by limiting the
effect of the statute to covenants which run with the land.9 4
"Touch or Concern" Rule
What determines when a covenant touches or concerns the
land demised is difficult of solution. Judge Clark has said that it
is impossible to lay down any absolute tests, 95 but ,he goes on to
state:
"Professor Bigelow has, however, in his article on The
Content of Covenants in Leases, [12 MIc-. L. REv. 639 (1914)]
set forth a scientific method of approach to the problem which
seems to afford the most practical working tests for the court
to employ. The method he states is to ascertain the exact
effect of the covenant upon the legal relations of the parties.
In effect it is a measuring of the legal relations of the parties
with and without the covenant. If the promi~or's legal rela-
tions in respect to the land in question are lessened-his legal
interest as owner rendered less valuable by the promise-the
burden of the covenant touches' or concerns that land; if the
promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are increased
-his legal interest as owner rendered more valuable by the
promise-the benefit of the promise touches or concerns that
land. It is necessary that this effect shiould be had upon the
legal relations of the parties as owners bf the land in question,
91 Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 513(1922).
92 E.g., statement in Miami Cooperative Mining Co. v. Cherokee Coal Co..
96 W. Va. 11, 122 S.E. 286 (1924), that a covenant by lessor to pay for im-
provements put on the premises by the lessee does not run with the land and
bind the assigns of the lessor. The West Virginia court would probably not
approve of the grounds that the courts used in the cases it cited as authority
for this statement.
93 165 Broadway Building v. City Investment Co., 120 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.
1941); Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N.E. 680 (1902);
Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73 Atl. 297 (1909); Myers
v. Burns. 33 Barb. Ch. 401 (N.Y. 1861); McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28
S.E.2d 603 (1943); Tennant v. Tennant, 69 W. Va. 28, 90 S.E. 861 (1911).94 Magoon v. Eastman, 86 Vt. 261, 84 At. 869 (1912); CLARK, COVENANTS
AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 96 (2d ed. 1947).
Or, CLARK, op. cit. supra note 94, at p. 96.
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and not merely as members of the community in general, such
as taxpayers, or owners of other land, in order that the covenant
may run. Thus, an agreement by the lessee to leave part of
the leased land unploughed each year restricts the lessee's
privilege of user, while it gives a right benefiting the lessor in
his reversion in the land by securing a crop rotation; hence
both right and duty should run. So a power in the lessor to
terminate the lease under certain conditions is a beneficial
power to the lessor as such and a burdensome liability to the
lessee, and both benefit and burden should run. But an
agreement by the lessee to pay taxes for the lessor on other
than the leased permises calls for the duty'of making a money
payment unconnected with the leased premises and a right for
the benefit of the lessor not in his capacity of reversioner, and
neither the right nor duty should run. 96
While it may be difficult to determine whether a covenant
touches or concerns the land as a general proposition, one can
always look at the cases to see what covenants have been held to
touch or concern the land and get a good general idea of the
courts' thinking on the subject. Examples of covenants which have
been held to touch or concern the land are the benefit and burden
of a covenant to repair the leased premises, 97 the burden of a
covenant by the tenant to pay rent,98 the burden of a covenant
by the lessee to pay the taxes on the leased premises, 9 the benefit
of a covenant by the lessee to vacate on sale and notice,100 and the
benefit and burden of a corresponding covenant by the lessor to
renew the lease,0o and the burden of a covenant by the lessee not
to carry on a business on the leased premises which would compete
with the lessor,10 2 but the benefit of a covenant by the lessor not to
carry on a business which would compete with the lessee within
a certain distance of ihe premises does not touch or concern the
leased premises and so does not run with the land. 102
Many other covenants have been held to touch or concern the
land or not to touch or concern the land, but these examples will
serve to give a general idea of the courts' thinking concerning the
two types of covenants.
90 Id. at 96, 97.
97 Myers v. Burns, 33 Barb. Ch. 401 (N.Y. 1861).98 Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., 159 Ind. 337, 64 N.E. 680 (1902).
99 Peck v. Christian, 94 II. App. 435 (1900).
100 507 Madison Avenue Realty Co. v. Martin, 200 App. Div. 146, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 762 (1922), aff'd (without opinion), 23 N.Y. 683, 135 N.E. 969 (1922).
101 Edwards v. Tobin, 132 Ore. 38, 284 Pac. 562, 68 A.L.R. 152 (1930).
102American Seaboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 619 (5th Cir.
1897). See Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890).
103 Thomas v. Hayward, L.R. 4 Ex. 311 (1869). Contra: Norman v. Wells,
17 Wend. 136 (N.Y. 1837).
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Intent of the Parties
Another thing which affects the running of covenants in leases
to a very great extent is whether or not the original parties intended
that they should run as indicated by the whole instrument of con-
veyance. Although there was nothing in the statute of Hen. VIII
in regard to the intent of the parties and under its general terms
a covenant would run regardless of such in ent, and in the limita-
tions put upon that statute in Spencer's Case, nothing was said as to
the intent of the parties, and one authority says that the intent
of the parties should not affect the running of covenants,1 04 the trend
of the modern decisions is to the contrary.10 5 In some cases it has
been stated to be one of the "age old" essentials of a covenant
which runs with the land; the other two being that there be
privity of estate and that the covenant touch or concern the land
with which it runs. 00  In fact, cases now quite often hold that the
only effect of the word "assigns" in a lease is to show the intent
of the parties that covenants therein should run with the land. 0 7
In a West Virginia case' 08 where the word "assigns" was used, the
court held that, although there was no privity of estate (this was
not a lease case) and so the covenant was not in nature and kind a
covenant real, the assignee of the covenantee could enforce the
covenant where the covenant benefited and did not charge the
land, since it was provided that the heirs, devisees and assigns of
the covenantee should have its benefits.
And in West Virginia the legislature has manifested a plain iii-
tent that the intent of the parties to the instrument of conveyance as
to the running of certain covenants, hereinafter to be discussed at
length, should be considered, if not controlling. In one statute it is
provided that certain covenants mentioned in the article containing
the statute shall run with the land "unless a contrary intent shall
104 SIMS, COVENANTS WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 115, 116 (1901).
105 165 Broadway Bldg. Co. v. City Investment Co., 120 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.
1941); Neponset Property Owner's Ass'n v. Immigrant Industrial Savings Bk.,
278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938); Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340
(1859); Brown v. Southern Pacific R.R., 36 Ore. 128, 58 Pac. 1104 (1899);
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 126 (3d ed. 1939).
100 Neponset Property Owner's Ass'n v. Immigrant Industrial Savings Bk.,
note 105 supra; Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340 (1859).
107 In Hart v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 291 N.Y. 13, 50 N.E.2d 285, 148
A.L.R. 390 (1943), the court stated that a provision in a lease purporting to
make all its provisions binding upon the parties and their assigns is ordinarily
employed not to impose direct contractual liability upon assigns but to make
it clear that the covenants in the lease run with the land. Masury v. Southworth,
9 Ohio St. 340 (1859).
108 Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903).
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be apparent from the conveyance", 10 9 and in another statute it is
provided that "The legal scope and effect of the covenants men-
tioned in this article, and the person or persons by and against
whom such covenants may be enforced, shall be determined ac-
cording to the rules of law applicable to such cases, and the plain
intent and meaning of the parties". 10
However, mere intent to make a covenant run with the land
is not sufficient in itself to make it run. As the original parties
cannot bind their assigns by privity of contract, it is necessary that
privity of estate exist between the party seeking to enforce the
covenant and the one against whom he is trying to enforce it. It
is further necessary that the covenant touch or concern the land
conveyed in order that the covenant be conveyed along with the
land. So it is generally held that, while a covenant which is of a
character that can run with the land does not run if the intent of
the parties appears otherwise, a covenant which is not of such
character will not run even if it clearly appears to have been the
intent of the parties that it should.111
Privity of Estate
The main objection to the enforcement of covenants in leases
by or against the assigns of the original parties has always been the
lack of privity of contract between others than the original con-
tracting parties. Chief Justice Holmes once said, ".... from a very
early date down to comparatively modern times lawyers have been
perplexed with the question how an assignee could sue upon a
contract to which he was not a party.""-'
The requirement of privity of estate is to establish a connecting
link between the two parties so that the assignee steps into the
shoes of his assignor and receives what benefits or burdens his
assignor had in regard to covenants. No privity, in a contractual
sense, exists between a covenantor and the assigns of the covenantee,
or the assigns of both the covenantor and the covenantee. To cure
this defect, at least as between the lessee and the assigns of the
lessor the statute of Hen. VIII was enacted. According to the
preamble of that statute it was thought necessary to enact the
109 W. VA. CODE c. 86, art. 4, § 16 (Michie, 1949).
110 W. VA. CODE C. 36, art. 4, § 17 (Michie, 1949).
111 Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill. 199, 3 N.E. 282 (1885); Masury v. Southworth,
9 Ohio St. 340 (1859); Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom. Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44
S.E. 520 (1903); Thomas v. Hayward, L.R. 4 Ex. 311 (1869). The intent of
the parties is only one of three essentials often held necessary for the running
of covenants. See note 106 supra.
112 Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
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statute in order that strangers to the covenant who had become
grantees of the estates could take advantage of the covenants in the
leases. The effect of the statute, and the common law rule which
made covenants run with the leasehold interest, was to create a
cause of action based upon privity of estate rather than privity of
contract.
Even though a covenant is of the type which runs with the
land, still there must be privity of estate between remote parties, or
between an original party and a remote party, before one can
enforce it against the other. The covenant may touch or concern
the land and the original parties may have intended that it should
run with the land, yet, if there be no privity of estate between
remote parties, it cannot be enforced by one against the other.
The courts, as has been noted, generally state that privity of
estate is one of the essentials of a covenant which runs with the
land. For example, in a West Virginia case the court stated:
"'It is not sufficient that the covenant is concehiing land, but
to make it run with the land there must be privity of estate
between the parties, and the covenant must have relation to
an interest created or conveyed, in order that the covenant
may pass to the grantee of the covenantee.' . . . It is true that
this covenant has one element of a covenant real in the fact
that it benefits the estate of the covenantee, the mill property;
but it lacks another material element, privity in estate, as
the company conveyed no interest in the mill, but merely made
a personal obligation on the company touching the mill. So
this covenant is not in its inherent nature, a real covenant."'11
But the courts do not, as a rule, explain what they mean by
privity of estate. They use the term as though it has a simple
and well-known meaning.
The term "privity of estate" is an ambiguous one, and it is
used in two different senses. It is sometimes used to describe the
situation in which two parties have simultaneous interests in the
same land. This might be called "mutual" privity. It is obvious
that in the landlord-tenant relationship we have the clearest kind
of privity of estate in the sense of co-existing interests in the same
land. Accordingly, in this sense, there is always privity of estate
between the original parties to the lease transaction, and in so
far as that is a requirement for the running of covenants, it presents
no problems.
Privity of estate is sometimes used, however, to describe the
relationship between successive holders of the same estate. Thus,
"13 Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 92, 44 S.E. 520, 522(1903).
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when L leases to T, there is privity of the mutual type between L
and T. When, thereafter T assigns his leasehold to A, there is
privity of estate of the successive type between T and A. Or, if L
should transfer his reversion to R, there is privity of estate of the
successive type between L and R. It should also be noted that
after T has transferred his leasehold interest to A and L his rever-
sion to R, there exists a mutual privity of estate between A and R,
because they own, simultaneously, interests in the same land. One
is a possessory interest, and the other a future interest which will
become possessory immediately upon the termination of the first.
In order for a covenant to run with the land, however, there
must be that "successive" privity of estate between the covenantee
and the remote party who seeks to enforce the covenant, or between
the covenantor and the remote party against whom the covenant is
being enforced. Thus, suppose L leases to T, but T, instead of
assigning his entire leasehold, sublets to S, a subtenant. It will be
noted that althbugh L now has an interest in the same land that
S does, and at the same time, L's interest does not immediately fol-
low Ss in possession. Instead, when S's sublease ends, the possession
will revert to T. Moreover, there is not successive privity between
T and S, as that term is used, because S has not fully succeeded
to T's interest. He has not so identified himself with the leasehold
interest of T that he can be charged with liability for a breach
of a covenant made by T. The covenant does not run with the
land so that it can be enforced by L against S. Notice that in this
case we could say that the covenant does not run because there is
no privity between the tenant (T) and the subtenant (S), or we
could say that it does not run because there is no privity between
the landlord (L) and S. 1 4 We would mean no successive privity
between T and S, but we would mean there is no mutual privity
between L and S, and we would be defining mutual privity to mean
more than merely having simultaneous interests in the same land.
We would be defining mutual privity as the relationship that
exists between the holders of two estates in the same land which
estates follow each other in possession.
The term "privity of estate" is used to describe the existence
of a mutual or successive relationship in the same land between two
114 "Since, in the case of a sublease, as distinguished from an assignment
of the lessee's full term, there remains an estate in the lessee, intervening
between the reversion and the estate or interest in the sublessee, there is no
privity of estate between the subtenant and the lessor, and, as there is no
privity of contract, the former is not liable to the latter for rent." Lunsford v.
McCann, 67 Okla. 196, 197, 169 Pac. 871 (1917); see also Times Square Imp.
Co. v. James McCreery Realty Corp., 228 N.Y. 597, 127 N.E. 922 (1920).
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or more different people. As between tenants in common, for
example, the privity of estate is solely of the mutual type, while
between a grantor and grantee it is of the successive type. But in
the relationship of lessor and lessee there exists a privity of estate
which is both mutual, since there is a simultaneous ownership of
two interests in the same land at the same time, and successive,
since the estate of the lessee issued from the lessor's ownership of
the land. Thus any assignee of the lessee or the lessor steps into
the shoes of his assignor and is in privity of estate with the owner
of the other interest in the land in both senses. There exists the
mutual type of privity of estate between the owners of the two
interests in the same land and since either assigned interest would
issue from the lessor's ownership of the land there also exists the
successive type of privity of estate.
It is easy enough to see that there is in fact privity of estate
in the case of leases inasmuch as in such case there exists a sever-
ance of one estate, a fee, into two estates, a leasehold estate and a
reversionary estate. Since the lessee obtains his estate from the
lessor there is privity of estate of the successive type which can be
passed on by assignment. There is also a mutual, simultaneous
ownership of two parts of one estate by two persons, and these two
estates are so interrelated that the leasehold estate cannot end
without that estate disappearing and the owner of the reversionary
estate again having the whole estate, the fee. So when the lessee's
estate ends, whether it is then held by the original lessee or his
assigns, his estate in possession immediately goes to the one then
holding the estate in reversion, whether it is held by the original
lessor or his assigns. So there is a mutual ownership of two parts
of one estate, and at the termination of one interest in such
estate a successive right to possession. Is it any wonder then that
in such a situation, in the first place, the owners of the two interests
in the fee should be interested in making covenants and conditions
in regard to the ownership and use of such interests, and, in the
second place, the successive owner of the two interests should be
interested in seeing that the covenants and conditions are carried
out?
This same type situation exists where the interest granted is a
right-of-way or other easement out of the fee estate. There again
when the interest granted terminates, it disappears into the fee. And
while it is in existence there is a simultaneous ownership of two
interests created out of what was one interest, the fee.
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A further illustration might be utilized as an aid to the under-
standing of privity of estate. A leases premises to B and then sells
the reversion (the property subject to the lease) to P. B assigns
his interest to C and C subleases the premises to D. There is privity
of estate between P and C because they each own a part of the
whole estate and because when C's interest terminates that interest
disappears and P then has the fee, the reversion plus the right to
possession; but there is no privity of estate between P and D
because, the sublease being for less than the remainder of the term,
C has retained the reversion in the leasehold estate and when D's
interest terminates C, not P, has the right to possession, and so C
is the only person with whom D is in privity of estate. There
remains privity of contract between A and B and between C and D.
If C should assign his interest that would destroy the privity of
estate existing between him and P, and he would no longer be
under any obligation to P as there would be no privity of any
kind upon which to base that obligation.115
Since there exists no privity of contract between one of the
original parties to the lease or his assigns and the assigns of the
other party, the courts generally hold that there must be privity
of estate before one can enforce a covenant in the lease against
the other.""8 It is necessary, in order that there be such privity of
estate between the parties to the action, that land, or some interest
therein, even less than the entire fee, to which a covenant in the
lease may attach as its vehicle of conveyance, must have been
transferred by the covenantor or covenantee or both before the
benefit or burden of a covenant will pass to the transferee." 7 Of
course, there must have been a conveyance between the original
parties to establish privity of estate before that privity can be
passed on to subsequent transferees."18
So, to establish privity of estate there must have been a con-
veyance of an estate;1" 9 a conveyance of something to which a
315 Kanawha-Gauley C. & C. Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 281 (1914).
11- In Sexaur v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N.W. 941 (1907), the court stated
that privity of estate had been held by many decisions to be the foundation of
the running of covenants. In McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607
u1943), the court stated that one of the essentials of a covenant real is that
there must be privity of estate even where the covenant touches or concerns
the land. See also 165 Broadway Bldg. v. City Investment Co., 120 F.2d 813
2d Cir. 1941); Logan v. United Interests, 236 N.Y. 194, 140 N.E. 240 (1923).
"17 McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943); Hurxthal v. St,
Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1902).
-8 Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 11 Am. Rep. 335 (1871).
19 In Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W.Va. 87, 92, 44 S.E. 590, 522
(1903), the court stated, "A covenant does not run with the land unless con-
tained in a grant thereof, or of some estate therein".
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covenant or condition in the instrument of conveyance which
affects that estate, beneficially or as a burden, which touches or
concerns it in such a way that such condition or covenant is an-
nexed or attached to the estate and will go along with it. There-
fore, it has been held that even though a covenant touched or
concerned land, was a benefit to the land in whosesoever hands it
might come, it did not run with the land when it was not con-
tained in a grant of land or an estate therein.12 1 Nor would a
covenant run which touched or concerned an estate reserved rather
than the one conveyed, as in the case of a lease of minerals and
then a conveyance of the land with the minerals reserved.'1,
Privity of estate being necessary in order for an assignee of
one of the original parties to be liable on covenants in the lease
which run with the land, it follows that when such an assignee, be
he an immediate or remote assignee, is only liable on, or entitled
to the benefits of, covenants in the lease during such time as such
privity exists; for if he in turn assigns the estate, all his relationship
to the covenant is sundered. So an assignee of one of the parties
who has not assumed the burdens of the covenants in the lease
is only liable for, or can only have the benefit of, breaches of
covenants in the lease which occur while the privity of estate exists
and not breaches occurring after he assigns the estate.122
It has been stated by the courts that privity of estate is merely
a substitute for an assignment of rights and delegation of duties.1'
Therefore, unless the covenant is one which touches or concerns
the land and there is privity of estate, the only way that an assignee
can ordinarily take advantage of a covenant in a lease is upon a
contractual basis, that is, by obtaining an assignment of the rights
under the covenant along with the assignment of the lease. He
may then bring action on the covenant in case of a breach in the
name of his assignor, or, in many states such as West Virginia,
in his own name by virtue of a statute2 allowing such procedure. 125
120 Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903).
121 Rawling v. Fisher, 101 W. Va. 253, 132 S.E. 489 (1926); Tennant v.
Tennant, 69 W. Va. 28, 70 S.E. 851 (1909).
122 Hart v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 291 N.Y. 13, 50 N.E.2d 285, 148 A.L.R.
390 (1943); Farmer's Bank v. Mutual Assurance Society, 4 Leigh 69 (Va. 1832);
Kanawha-Gauley C. & C. Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 281 (1914).
123 "So privity of contract is connection of interest through the contract
relation, and privity of estate is such connection by means of estates in
property." CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 112 (2d
ed. 1947). See also, DONLEY, LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAS IN VIRGINIA AND Wsr
VIRGINIA 182 (1951).
124 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
125 This was held to be the only way that the assignee of the lessor could
take advantage of the covenant in a lease in Ohio, since covenants did not run
31
Brown: Covenants in Leases in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955
COVENANTS IN LEASES
The only way that an assignee can be held liable to perform the
covenants in a lease where they are not of a character that can run
with the land is by an assumption of the burdens of such covenants
when he takes the assignment of the lease. In such case he is bound
by privity of contract and he cannot rid himself of the burden of the
covenants by the simple expedient of assigning over.121 Even if the
assignee does assume the burden of the covenants in the lease, he
may be liable only to his assignor because he is in privity of contract
with him only. This lack of privity is overcome in states allowing
actions by the third-party beneficiary of a contract. But in West
Virginia, although there is a statute allowing action by third-party
beneficiaries, 12" the contract or promise must have been made for
their sole benefit before they can bring an action at law on it. 2 s
This is not likely to be the case where an assignee assumes the
burdens of covenants in a lease as the assignor also benefits in most
cases. However, it has been held that such a beneficiary can
enforce covenants in equity in such a case even if the contract was
not made for his exclusive benefit.
1 2
To be concluded.
with the reversion at common law and the statute of Hen. VIII was held not
to be a part of the Ohio law. Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340 (1859).
126 S. S. Kresge Co. v. Sears, 15 F. Supp. 522 (D. Mass. 1936); Bankers
Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Manarch Smokeless Coal Co., 123 W. Va. 53, 14 S.E,2d
922 (1941); 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 158 (n) (1912).
127 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 8, § 12 (Michie, 1949).
128 Petty v. Warren, 90 W. Va. 397, 110 S.E. 896 (1922).
129 Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Monarch Smokeless Coal Co., 123 W. Va.
53, 14 S.E.2d 922 (1941).
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